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Guarantees and Section 548(a)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code
Guarantees" of one company's obligations by another company
are common in the business community. When a company seeks
financing, the lender,2 unwilling to rely solely on the borrower's
promise to repay the loan, may require the company to supply a
guarantor before it will agree to the loan.3 The guarantor might be
either an affiliate4 of the company seeking the loan or an indepen-
dent party. Under the terms of a typical guarantee, the guarantor
is responsible for repaying the loan in the event of a default by the
borrower (known as the obligor).5
This comment considers the circumstances in which a guaran-
tee given by a guarantor who has become a debtor6 in bankruptcy
can be set aside as a fraudulent conveyance under section 548(a)(2)
2 A "guarantee," or "guaranty," is "[a]n undertaking or promise that is collateral to
primary or principal obligation and that binds guarantor to performance in event of nonper-
formance by the principal obligor." BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY 634 (5th ed. 1979).
In this comment, the term "guarantee" embraces both guarantees and sureties; the dif-
ferences between these two obligations are not relevant in the present context. For a discus-
sion of the distinction between guarantees and sureties, see ARTHUR STEARNS, THE LAW OF
SURETYSHIP § 1.5 (5th ed. 1951); Peters, Suretyship Under Article 3 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 833, 837-43 (1968); 38 AM. JUR. 2D Guaranty § 15 (1968).
2 In this comment, a "lender" is any party that is willing to extend, or that is consider-
ing extending, credit to the obligor.
3 As part of a guarantee, the guarantor may grant the lender a security interest in some
of the guarantor's property. The Bankruptcy Code (the Code) defines a "security interest"
as a "lien created by an agreement." 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(43) (West Pamphlet No. 2 (Sept.
1984)). This term includes interests in both real and personal property. S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. Acquiring a security interest
will further reduce the lender's risk. See Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Pri-
orities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1149-58 (1979).
"Affiliate" is defined in the Code as a
corporation 20 percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or
indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor, or by an entity
that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or
more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 101(2)(B) (1982).
5 The three parties in the guarantee transaction are the obligor (who makes the princi-
pal promise), the obligee (to whom the promise is made), and the guarantor. In the transac-
tions examined in this comment, the obligee is always the lender, see supra note 2, and the
guarantor is always the debtor in bankruptcy, see infra note 6.
6 A "debtor" is a "person or municipality concerning which a case under [the Code] has
been commenced." 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1982).
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of the Bankruptcy Code.7 The courts and commentators have not
properly analyzed the relationship between the three parties in the
guarantee transaction.$ They have focused on the relationship be-
tween the debtor and the lender and have asked whether the guar-
antee constituted a fraudulent conveyance from the debtor to the
lender. This comment will show that it is the obligor, not the
lender, that benefits from the debtor's guarantee and that one
should therefore examine the transaction between the debtor and
the obligor to determine whether a fraudulent conveyance under
section 548(a)(2) has occurred.
Part I of this comment examines the structure and scope of
section 548(a)(2). It concludes that this provision protects creditors
from transactions that decrease the debtor's net worth and impair
the rights of creditors to repayment from the debtor's assets. Part
II argues that courts should treat the grant of a guarantee as a
conveyance by the debtor to the obigor. Part III illustrates the
application of section 548(a)(2) to the transaction between the
debtor and the obligor and concludes that the debtor conveys
value to the obligor when it becomes bound under the terms of the
lending agreement and that the value of the debtor's promise
should be measured by computing the expected value of the
debtor's liability under the guarantee. Part III also examines the
special case of an intercorporate guarantee, suggesting that there
be a rebuttable presumption that the debtor received a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for its guarantee if the debtor was the
parent of the obligor.
I. SECTION 548(a)(2) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
The Bankruptcy Code (the Code)9 gives the trustee in bank-
ruptcy10 the power to avoid, as fraudulent conveyances, certain
7 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(2) (West 1979 & Pamphlet No. 2 (Sept. 1984)). The text of this
provision is quoted infra note 12.
' See Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 661 F.2d 979, 991-96 (2d Cir. 1981);
Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 13 Ariz. App. 431, 433-36, 477 P.2d 550, 552-55
(1970); Coquillette, Guaranty of and Security for the Debt of a Parent Corporation by a
Subsidiary Corporation, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 433, 448-60 (1980); Rosenberg, Intercorpo-
rate Guarantees and the Law of Fraudulent Conveyances: Lender Beware, 125 U. PA. L.
REv. 235, 242-46 (1976).
Professor Rosenberg offers two possible explanations for the paucity of case law ad-
dressing this issue. First, many bankruptcy decisions are not reported; second, there is an
institutional preference for settling this sort of case. Rosenberg, supra, at 239.
9 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151,326 (1982) (subsequent amendments codified at 11 U.S.C.A.
§§ 101-151,326 (West 1979 & Pamphlet No. 2 (Sept. 1984))).
10 The trustee is the court-appointed manager of the debtor's estate. See 11 U.S.C.A.
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transactions in which the debtor transferred property or incurred
an obligation within one year of filing a petition in bankruptcy."
Under section 548 of the Code, 2 there are two ways in which a
§§ 321-325 (West 1979 & Pamphlet No. 2 (Sept. 1984)).
11 Id. § 548. This is one of the trustee's "avoiding powers." See id. §§ 544-548. These
powers permit the trustee to avoid the transfer to other entities of property that belonged to
the debtor prior to bankruptcy. See Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 725, 725 n.1 (1984). The trustee can also attack a fraudulent conveyance under state
fraudulent conveyance law. See infra note 12.
Fraudulent conveyance law has a history dating back to the sixteenth century. For a
discussion of this history, see 1 GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFER-
ENCES §§ 58-62(b) (1940); infra note 16.
12 Section 548 reads as follows:
Fraudulent transfers and obligations
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or
any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year
before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily-
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hin-
der, delay, or defraud an entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the
date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such
transfer or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obliga-
tion incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;
(ii) was engaged in business, or a transaction, or was about to engage in busi-
ness or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an
unreasonably small capital; or
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that
would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured.
(b) The trustee of a partnership debtor may avoid any transfer of an interest of
the debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or
incurred on or within one year before the date of the filing of the petition, to a general
partner in the debtor, if the debtor was insolvent on the date such transfer was made
or such obligation incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or
obligation.
(C) Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation voidable under this section is
voidable under section 544, 545, or 547 of this title, a transferee or obligee of such a
transfer or obligation that takes for value and in good faith has a lien on or may retain
any interest transferred, or may enforce any obligation incurred, as the case may be, to
the extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor in exchange for such
transfer or obligation.
(d)(1) For the purposes of this section, a transfer is made when such transfer is so
far perfected that a bona fide purchaser from the debtor against whom applicable law
permits such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the property trans-
ferred that is superior to the interest in such property of the transferee, but if such
transfer is not so perfected before the commencement of the case, such transfer is
made immediately before the date of the filing of the petition.
(2) In this section-
(A) "value" means property, or satisfaction or securing of a present or antece-
dent debt of the debtor, but does not include an unperformed promise to furnish
support to the debtor or to a relative of the debtor;
(B) a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker financial in-
stitution, or securities clearing agency that receives a margin payment, as defined
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trustee may avoid such a transaction as a fraudulent conveyance.13
Section 548(a)(1) allows the trustee to avoid a conveyance if he can
prove that the debtor made the conveyance with the "actual intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud" its creditors.14 While this method of
attacking a fraudulent conveyance is available to the trustee in the
case of guarantee transactions, this comment will focus on the
more troublesome cases where evidence of actual fraudulent intent
on the part of the debtor is lacking. 5
Section 548(a)(2) allows the trustee to avoid all transactions
that decrease the debtor's net worth and impair the rights of the
debtor's creditors to payment in full.'6 Under section 548(a)(2), the
in section 741(5) or 761(15) of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in sec-
tion 741(8) of this title, takes for value to the extent of such payment.
11 U.S.C.A. § 548 (West 1979 & Pamphlet No. 2 (Sept. 1984)).
The trustee can also avoid a fraudulent conveyance under the appropriate state law. 11
U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982). In many instances the state law provisions will be similar to section
548 because this section has been derived from the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(the U.F.C.A.), 7A U.LA 161 (1978). See infra note 16.
" 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a) (West 1979 & Pamphlet No. 2 (Sept. 1984)) (quoted supra note
12).
" Id. § 548(a)(1).
15 Because establishing the existence of actual intent to defraud turns upon the facts of
each case, the important issues in litigation under section 548(a)(1) are evidentiary. Thus, a
resolution based upon general principles, like the one suggested in this comment, would be
less helpful in the context of a fraudulent conveyance under section 548(a)(1).
" This comment asserts only that section 548(a)(2) reaches those transactions that de-
crease the debtor's net worth and impair the rights of the debtor's creditors; it does not go
so far as to argue that Congress had this purpose specifically in mind when it enacted the
section. Although it seems plausible that the draftsmen of this section intended to protect
creditors against this type of transaction, at least one commentator has taken a slightly
different position. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 777-80. Professor Jackson argues that the
objective standard of fraudulent conveyance law codified in section 548(a)(2) serves as a
substitute for a subjective standard that would avoid only those transactions in which the
debtor intended to defraud his creditors. In his view, the objective standard, which is both
under- and overinclusive, was adopted because of the difficulty of proving intent. Id. at 778.
This comment's approach to section 548(a)(2) differs from Professor Jackson's with respect
to only one question: whether an insolvent debtor that conveys property in exchange for less
than a reasonably equivalent value without the intent to defraud, delay, or hinder its credi-
tors should be deemed to have made a fraudulent conveyance. This comment and Professor
Jackson agree that, under section 548(a)(2) as it is written, such a debtor is deemed to have
made a fraudulent conveyance.
The history of fraudulent conveyance law lends support to the notion that section
548(a)(2) protects creditors from transactions that decrease the debtor's estate and impair
their rights, regardless of the debtor's intent. As first enacted in 1571, the Elizabethan Stat-
ute of Fraudulent Conveyances, 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571), was both a penal and a revenue-
raising measure aimed at debtors who hid assets from their creditors. In 1603, Parliament
revised the Bankruptcy Act, 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571), to give the trustee the power to recapture
all property that the debtor conveyed away unless the transfer had been made for marriage
or "some good consideration." 1 Jac., ch. 15 (1603). This law allowed the trustee to set aside
transactions that decreased the debtor's net worth even when the debtor was not insolvent.
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trustee may avoid a conveyance if (1) the debtor did not receive a
"reasonably equivalent value" for the property it transferred or the
obligation it incurred and (2) the debtor was in poor financial con-
dition before or as a result of the transaction. 17 The requirement
that the debtor receive less than a "reasonably equivalent value"' 8
isolates those transactions that decrease the debtor's net worth,
while the requirement that the debtor be in poor financial condi-
tion ensures that only those transactions that impair the rights of
the debtor's creditors will be set aside. If a transaction meets these
requirements, the Code provides that the parties to this transac-
tion be restored to the positions they would have occupied had no
fraudulent conveyance occurred. 9
Section 548(a)(2) apparently contemplates a paradigmatic
two-party transaction. Assume that Debtor gives $100 to Friend
for Friend's birthday. Debtor, who has given Friend $100 on each
A major development in modern fraudulent conveyance law was the drafting of the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 7A U.L.A. 161 (1978), from which section 67(d) of the
old Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1976) (superseded 1979), and section 548 of the
present Code were in turn derived. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 89-90; H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1977) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; Analysis of
H.R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 214 (1936), reprinted in 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 548.01
n.7 (15th ed. 1979) ("We have condensed the provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act, retaining its substance and, as far as possible, its language."); see also JACOB
WEINSTEIN, THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF 1938, at 139 (1938) ("The Chandler Act has recast
[§ 67] in a more orderly form and has made it more comprehensive."). The draftsmen of the
U.F.C.A. indicated that the purpose of these provisions was to protect creditors from con-
veyances that injured their rights:
The Statute of Elizabeth condemns conveyances as fraudulent only when made
with the "intent" to "hinder, delay or defraud." There are many conveyances which
wrong creditors where an intent to defraud on the part of the debtor does not in fact
exist. In order to avoid these conveyances, the courts have called to their assistance
presumptions of law as to intent, and in equity have pushed the presumption of fraud
as a fact to an unwarranted extent; with the result that, while in the main the decisions
under the facts do justice, the reasoning supporting them leaves much to be desired.
In the Act as drafted all possibility of a presumption of law as to intent is avoided.
Certain conveyances which the courts have in practice condemned, such as a gift by an
insolvent, are declared fraudulent irrespective of intent.
U.F.C.A. commissioners' prefatory note, 7A U.LA 162 (1978) (emphasis added). The legisla-
tive history of section 548 does not indicate that the framers of that section viewed the role
of fraudulent conveyance law any differently than did the draftsmen of the U.F.C.A. See
SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 5-6, 89-90; HOUSE REPORT, supra, at 375.
'7 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(2) (West 1979 & Pamphlet No. 2 (Sept. 1984)) (quoted supra
note 12).
'8 In the analogous section of the U.F.C.A., U.F.CA. § 3, 7A U.L.A. 181 (1978), the term
"fair consideration" is used. The legislative history, which gives no reason for the change in
terminology, suggests that "reasonably equivalent value" means the same as "fair considera-
tion." See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 89-90; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 375.
19 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(c) (West 1979 & Pamphlet No. 2 (Sept. 1984)) (quoted supra
note 12); infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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of his past ten birthdays, makes this conveyance without the intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors.2 0 If Debtor was insolvent
at the time of this transfer, the trustee can recover the $100 as a
fraudulent conveyance under section 548(a)(2). Because Debtor did
not receive a reasonably equivalent value in this transaction, he
lost value on the exchange and his net worth has necessarily been
reduced."
Not all transactions that decrease the debtor's net worth, how-
ever, can be set aside as fraudulent conveyances. In addition to
having received less than a reasonably equivalent value, the debtor
must have been in poor financial condition immediately after the
challenged transaction. 2 The Code provides three alternative tests
by which the trustee can satisfy this requirement: he can show (1)
that the debtor was insolvent,23 (2) that the debtor was undercapi-
talized,2 4 or (3) that the debtor thought that it would be unable to
pay its debts as they matured.25
In order for the debtor to be insolvent under the first test for
poor financial condition, its liabilities must exceed its assets, 26 so
20 The draftsmen of the U.F.C.A. indicated that the objective insolvency standard was
designed for this type of conveyance. U.F.CA commissioners' prefatory note, 7A U.LA 162
(1978); cf. Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARv. L. REV. 505,
509-10 (1977) (using a similar example to examine the normative underpinnings of fraudu-
lent conveyance law).
21 Further, to be set aside as a fraudulent conveyance, the transaction must decrease
the debtor's net worth significantly. Under section 548(a)(2) the trustee must prove not only
that the debtor received less than it gave but also that these two amounts were not even
reasonably equivalent. Thus, the total decrease in the debtor's net worth attributable to the
fraudulent conveyance is irrelevant: the existence of a reasonably equivalent value depends
upon the values exchanged in the transaction. A hundred-dollar loss in a multi-million-dol-
lar transaction is insignificant in comparison with a hundred-dollar loss in a hundred-dollar
transaction. The debtor has received a reasonably equivalent value in the first transaction,
but not in the second.
22 The Code does not use the term "poor financial condition," but the tests that it
provides can best be understood as tests of the debtor's financial condition. See infra notes
23-30 and accompanying text.
23 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i) (West 1979 & Pamphlet No. 2 (Sept. 1984)) (quoted
supra note 12). The corresponding section of the U.F.C.A. is U.F.CA. § 4, 7A U.LA. 205
(1978).
24 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii) (West 1979 & Pamphlet No. 2 (Sept. 1984)) (quoted
supra note 12). The corresponding section of the U.F.C.A. is U.F.CA § 5, 7A U.LA 237
(1978).
2- 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(2)(B)(iii) (West 1979 & Pamphlet No. 2 (Sept. 1984)) (quoted
supra note 12). The corresponding section of the U.F.C.A. is U.F.CA § 4, 7A U.LA 240
(1978). Section 548(a)(2) also requires that the challenged conveyance have occurred within
one year of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(2) (West 1979 &
Pamphlet No. 2 (Sept. 1984)) (quoted supra note 12).
20 The Code defines "insolvent" for an entity other than a partnership as
financial condition such that the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all such
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that all of its assets are subject to its creditors' claims. When this
occurs, any diminution of its assets without a corresponding dimi-
nution of its liabilities will reduce the amount that the creditors
will receive in satisfaction of their claims. In our paradigmatic
case, if Debtor is solvent after he transfers $100 to Friend, his
creditors' rights have not been impaired because Debtor still has
enough assets to pay them off in full. The situation changes dra-
matically, however, if Debtor has creditors with $1000 of unsecured
claims2 7 and only $600 in unencumbered assets before the convey-
ance. Before Debtor gives $100 to Friend, Debtor's creditors stand
to receive sixty percent of the face amount of their claims. After
the gift, his creditors will receive only fifty percent. By decreasing
his net worth, Debtor has decreased the value of his creditors'
claims.
The trustee can also set aside transactions that, in addition to
decreasing the debtor's net worth, leave the debtor undercapital-
ized. The rationale behind this test for poor financial condition is
that if a debtor is solvent after a conveyance but nevertheless has
"an unreasonably small capital"28 remaining, the likelihood of in-
solvency is increased by the transaction. A debtor will rarely find
itself transformed from a financially sound entity into an insolvent
one overnight; rather, the debtor usually slides into insolvency. It
would be senseless to attempt to determine the debtor's solvency
immediately after the challenged transaction and to hold that the
debtor's solvency at that time determines whether or not a fraudu-
lent conveyance has been made. For example, assume that in our
paradigmatic case Debtor has $250 worth of assets and $100 worth
of liabilities before the $100 conveyance to Friend. Assume further
that Debtor makes widgets and that the cash-flow requirements of
widget manufacturing are such that $1000 of working capital must
be on hand at all times. Debtor is clearly on the road to bank-
ruptcy, and Debtor's creditors are injured just as much by a con-
veyance of $100 to Friend at this time as by a similar conveyance
entity's property, at a fair valuation, exclusive of-
(i) property transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud such entity's creditors; and
(ii) property that may be exempted from property of the estate under section
522 of this title. ...
11 U.S.C.A. § 101(29)(A) (West Pamphlet No. 2 (Sept. 1984)).
27 Unsecured general creditors share proportionately in what remains after secured
creditors and employees have been paid in full. See id. § 726.
28 Id. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii) (West 1979 & Pamphlet No. 2 (Sept. 1984)) (quoted supra note
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when Debtor is insolvent: when Debtor becomes bankrupt, the
conveyance will have reduced by $100 the amount available to sat-
isfy their claims. Thus, in determining whether a fraudulent con-
veyance has occurred under section 548(a)(2), it is sufficient that
the debtor be undercapitalized immediately after the transaction.
Finally, the trustee may avoid a conveyance if, in addition to
not receiving a reasonably equivalent value, the debtor believed
that, after the conveyance, it would be unable to pay its debts as
they matured.2 9 This requirement is similar to the test under sec-
tion 548(a)(1) because both require an examination of the debtor's
state of mind. But this test is a distinct method of attacking a con-
veyance, and it is aimed at a kind of transaction not covered by
section 548(a)(1). In order to illustrate the transaction for which
this section is designed, assume that in our paradigmatic case
Debtor is neither insolvent nor undercapitalized but knows that
his business will fail in the near future due to recent technological
advances. His gift of $100 to Friend is not a fraudulent conveyance
under section 548(a)(1) because it is not made with the intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors. It is, however, a fraudulent
conveyance under section 548(a)(2). Allowing the trustee to set
aside this transaction is justified on the same ground that justifies
allowing him to set aside the similar transaction that left Debtor
undercapitalized: a debtor does not become insolvent overnight;
rather, it slides into insolvency. A debtor that realizes that the
slide into insolvency has begun should not be permitted to make a
conveyance that would be prohibited on the part of another debtor
merely because the other debtor's slide into bankruptcy meets cer-
tain objective standards.
Once a conveyance is deemed fraudulent under section
548(a)(2), the Code allows the trustee to restore the parties to the
positions they would have occupied had the fraudulent conveyance
not occurred. Under section 550(a),10 the trustee can recover from
29 Id. Such a debtor may be an entity engaged in a seasonal business. For example, a
farmer may be solvent because the value of his assets, including the crop nearing harvest,
exceeds his liabilities. Even though solvent, however, he may not be able to pay his debts as
they mature because his assets cannot be readily converted into money.
30 Section 550(a) reads as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is
avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, the trustee may
recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so orders,
the value of such property, from-
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such
transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.
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the recipient any fraudulent conveyance made by the debtor.
Thus, in our paradigmatic case, Friend would have to return $100
to Debtor's estate. Section 548(c), however, protects parties that
give value to the debtor in good faith. To the extent they have
given value, these parties are given a lien on any property trans-
ferred back to the debtor or are allowed to enforce any obligation
to them that was incurred by the debtor in the transaction.31 If
Friend, instead of receiving the $100 as a birthday present, had in
good faith sold Debtor his torts book, valued at $10, for $100, then
Friend would have to give back $100 and would have a $10 lien on
the torts book. Even though Friend may not receive $10 from the
lien he holds,32 Friend is placed in the same position he would oc-
cupy if the fraudulent conveyance had not occurred.3 3
II. SECTION 548(a)(2) AND THE GUARANTEE TRANSACTION
A guarantee is part of a three-party transaction: the lender ex-
tends credit to the obligor in return for the promise of both the
obligor and the guarantor to repay the loan. Confusion about the
proper application of section 548(a)(2) to guarantees has arisen for
two reasons: (1) the guarantee transaction is conceptually complex
and (2) section 548 was not drafted with such three-party transac-
tions in mind.
A. Analyzing the Guarantee Transaction
The guarantee transaction can best be analyzed by modifying
the paradigm discussed in Part I. Assume that the insolvent
Id. § 550(a).
Id. § 548(c) (quoted supra note 12).
32 The value of the book may have decreased in the period between the conveyance and
the bankruptcy proceeding.
11 Friend's conveyance of the torts book to Debtor imposes an obligation on Debtor to
pay for it. If there had been no fraudulent conveyance, we cannot be certain whether Debtor
would have bought it for cash or on credit. If Friend were allowed to return only the excess
value received over the value of the book, the transaction could, in effect, be characterized
as a sale for cash, and Friend would receive the full value of the book. But in situations
where it is unclear what would have happened, the Code resolves the uncertainty against the
creditor. For example, a trustee given the status of a hypothetical lien creditor by 11
U.S.C.A. § 544(a) (West Pamphlet No. 2 (Sept. 1984)) can set aside an unperfected security
interest even though an unsecured creditor might not be able to do so. Outside of bank-
ruptcy, an unsecured creditor could reduce his claim to judgment and become a lien credi-
tor, with priority over an unperfected secured creditor. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1978). At
the time of a bankruptcy petition, it is impossible to determine whether the secured creditor
would perfect his security interest before an unsecured creditor reduced his claim to judg-
ment. In the face of this uncertainty, the Bankruptcy Code resolves the doubt against the
secured creditor. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 732-36.
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Debtor, wishing to make his yearly gift to Friend but finding him-
self short of cash, borrows $100 from Bank at an appropriate inter-
est rate and then conveys this money to Friend. (This case is "Va-
riation One.") Here there are two separate transactions: (1) the
exchange of Debtor's promise to pay $100 in return for $100 from
Bank and (2) the conveyance of the $100 by Debtor to Friend.
Considered by itself, the second transaction is clearly a fraudulent
conveyance because the gift of $100 to Friend impaired Debtor's
net worth. The first transaction, however, is not a fraudulent con-
veyance: Debtor received a reasonably equivalent value from
Bank-$100 in cash-in exchange for its promise to repay the $100
plus interest. Thus, the transaction with Bank did not impair
Debtor's net worth.
Now assume that instead of receiving $100 from Bank and
then giving it to Friend, Debtor instructs Bank to give the $100
directly to Friend. ("Variation Two.") In substance, this transac-
tion is identical to the previous one: both result in Bank exchang-
ing $100 for a promise of equal value while the net worth of Debtor
is decreased by $100 and the net worth of Friend is increased by
$100. Debtor's promise to Bank should not be treated as a fraudu-
lent conveyance.3 4 Debtor has given a promise worth $100 to Bank,
but Bank has not been enriched by it because Bank also gave $100
to Friend at Debtor's request. Because fraudulent conveyance law
seeks to place the parties in the position they would have been in
had no fraudulent conveyance occurred, it would be anomalous to
set aside Debtor's obligation to Bank, leaving Bank $100 poorer
than it would have been had it not entered into the transaction.
Yet the language of the Code seems to demand precisely this
result.
A literal reading of the Code would protect Bank in Variation
One and not in Variation Two simply because in Variation Two
Bank transfers the money directly to Friend while in Variation
One it gives the money to Debtor who then transfers it to Friend.
Section 548(a) provides: "The trustee may avoid any transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by
the debtor. . . ."35 In Variation One, Debtor transferred an inter-
"' This is true under either view of the purpose of fraudulent conveyance law. See
supra note 16. Under Professor Jackson's view, section 548(a)(2) is a proxy for intent. In
Variation Two, the debtor intended to give away its assets to the obligor, not to the lender.
Under the view adopted in this comment, the lender's receipt of the guarantee did not de-
crease the debtor's net worth and impair the right of the debtor's creditors; the lack of value
from the obligor did.
35 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a) (West 1979 & Pamphlet No. 2 (Sept. 1984)) (emphasis added)
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est in property to Friend, and the Code recognizes this transfer as
a fraudulent conveyance. In Variation Two, Debtor incurred an ob-
ligation to Bank; he neither incurred an obligation nor transferred
property to Friend. Thus, the Code does not recognize the transfer
of value to Friend as a fraudulent conveyance. Although Variations
One and Two have the same economic effect, section 548 appears
to treat them differently. Further, Bank cannot claim protection
under section 548(c) because that section only protects those par-
ties that in good faith give value to the debtor,3" and Bank has
given value only to Friend.
This anomalous effect of section 548 was not a result intended
by Congress. In fact, it is apparent that such a three-party transac-
tion was not even considered when section 548 was drafted. The
report prepared by the Bankruptcy Commission refused to take a
position on how section 548 would affect the grant of a guarantee,
expressly leaving this problem to be resolved by the courts.3 7 Had
it considered this three-party transaction when it drafted the
Code, the Commission might have been able to supply a more de-
finitive statement; in fact, however, it did not.
The legislative history of section 548(c) also suggests that Con-
gress did not consider three-party transactions. Section 548(c) pro-
tects those creditors that in good faith enter into a transaction
with the debtor that is later avoided as a fraudulent conveyance.
This protection is of no avail to the lender in a three-party guaran-
tee transaction because the language of section 548(c) limits its
protection to those who have given value to the debtor.3 8 Yet the
legislative history of the section suggests a different and broader
concern: "If a [creditor's] only liability to the trustee is under [sec-
tion 548], and if he takes for value and in good faith, then subsec-
tion (c) grants him a lien on the property transferred, or other sim-
ilar protection."3 9 This language shows that Congress was
concerned more with the creditor's behavior-his good faith-than
with the mechanics of how and where value passes. Following the
language in the legislative history, a good-faith lender, liable to the
(quoted supra note 12).
36 Id. § 548(c) (quoted supra note 12).
37 COMMISSION ON THE BANKRuPTcY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE
COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 177 (1973) ("It is left to case law to determine when an attack on a guarantee. . . by
the debtor is proper on the ground that the debtor did not receive a reasonably equivalent
value.").
" See supra text accompanying note 36.
39 SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 89.
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trustee under a literal reading of section 548(a)(2), would be pro-
tected in Variation Two just as in Variation One. If Congress had
intended that different treatment be accorded the two variations
under consideration, it would not have characterized the scope of
section 548(c) so broadly. The discrepancy between the legislative
history and the language of the statute thus suggests that Congress
did not consider the three-party guarantee transaction when it en-
acted section 548. The legislative history envisions a judicial solu-
tion to problems of guarantee transactions. The next section of this
comment proposes an analysis consonant with the overall scheme
of section 548.
B. Isolating the Fraudulent Conveyance in a Guarantee
Transaction
In Variation Two above, Friend has been enriched by $100
while Debtor's net worth has been decreased by $100 as a result of
the transaction. This would seem to be the result of a fraudulent
conveyance, but Friend has received neither property nor an obli-
gation from Debtor.40 Debtor has incurred an obligation to Bank,
but Bank has not been enriched by it: the value of Debtor's prom-
ise, worth $100, is offset by the $100 that Bank has passed to
Friend. If Bank is to be protected, the trustee must be required to
seek the return of the $100 from Friend, not Bank. It is therefore
sensible and consistent with the intended application of section
548 to recharacterize the three-party transaction as two two-party
transactions. Variation Two should be treated as (1) a transfer of
$100 from Bank to Debtor in exchange for Debtor's promise of re-
payment and (2) a transfer from Debtor to Friend of this same
$100.41
40 The trustee does not have an action against Friend under section 550(a) (West 1979
& Pamphlet No. 2 (Sept. 1984)) because that section, by its terms, applies only to avoided
transfers. 11 U.S.C.A. § 550(a) (quoted supra note 30). In Variation Two, the fraudulent
conveyance results from the incurring of an obligation, not from a transfer.
"' The Eleventh Circuit recently adopted a similar approach in a case involving a lever-
aged buyout. See In re Greenbrook Carpet Co., 722 F.2d 659 (11th Cir. 1984). The Greens,
owners of Greenbrook Carpet Co., wished to acquire a controlling interest in Lewis Carpet
Mills, Inc. The National City Bank of Rome refused to lend money to the Greens but did
lend money to Greenbrook Carpet. Greenbrook Carpet immediately transferred the funds to
the Greens, who used them to purchase the Lewis stock, granting Greenbrook Carpet a se-
curity interest in that stock. Id. at 660. The trustee sought to have this transaction treated
as a loan from the bank to the Greens in which Greenbrook granted a security interest in its
inventory in exchange for a worthless security interest in Lewis's stock. Id. The court re-
fused to adopt this analysis because "[t]he issue under section [548](a)(2) is whether the
bank received more consideration than it was due." Id. at 661 (emphasis in original). The
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The grant of a guarantee by a party who later enters bank-
ruptcy is closely analogous to Variation Two, with the debtor-guar-
antor occupying the position of Debtor and the obligor occupying
the position of Friend. The only difference is that in a guarantee
transaction, the obligor has not simply received a transfer from the
bank: it is primarily liable on an obligation to the lender. Thus, the
relevant inquiry aims to identify the party to whom the debtor's
promise has value. If, as in Variation Two, the obligor is the only
party that receives value from the debtor's promise, the transac-
tion should be recharacterized as a fraudulent conveyance to the
obligor.
Before considering who receives the benefit from the debtor's
guarantee in a three-party lending arrangement, it is helpful to
consider the simpler two-party lending transaction. In the two-
party context, a lender who considers extending credit to an entity
will base the terms of the loan upon the entity's ability to repay.42
Thus, if Bank lends money to Friend, the interest rate that Friend
must pay will be based on Friend's ability to repay the loan.4s As
long as this is an arm's-length transaction, no one could seriously
contend that it is a fraudulent conveyance: Friend's promise equals
the value transferred by Bank, and Friend's creditors' rights of re-
payment have not been impaired.
In some instances, however, a lender will not be willing to ex-
tend credit to an entity if all that entity can offer in return is its
own promise to repay. For example, if the entity is a subsidiary in
a closely held group of corporations, the lender may be wary of the
possibility that intercorporate transfers might significantly deplete
the assets upon which it could levy in the event of a default. Thus,
the lender may require that the parent add its promise to that of
its subsidiary. In this transaction, the lender will set the rate of
interest as it would in a normal two-party transaction: it will deter-
mine the value of the promises to repay the loan. The only differ-
ence is that the lender is now evaluating the worth of two separate
court's opinion does not indicate whether this analysis is derived from considerations such
as those suggested in this comment or from a literal application of section 548(a)(2).
42 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 293-94 (2d ed. 1977) ("The interest
rate on a loan to a corporation will reflect the risk of default as that risk is estimated when
the loan agreement is signed."); Jackson & Kronman, supra note 3, at 1149 ("The price a
creditor charges for extending credit . . . varies directly with the riskiness of the loan
itself.").
43 For example, if there is only a 50% probability that the borrower will be able to keep
its promise to repay the loan, with interest, and a 50% probability that nothing will be
repaid, the lender will demand a stated rate of interest such that 0.50 of the principal plus
0.50 of the stated rate of interest will equal the lender's required rate of interest.
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promises. For example, assume that Debtor Co., the parent of Sub-
sidiary Co., guarantees Bank's loan to Subsidiary Co. The rate of
interest that Bank will charge should be less than it would be for
an unguaranteed loan to Subsidiary Co. because Bank faces less
risk. In this situation, Bank has not gained any value by virtue of
the addition of Debtor Co.'s guarantee. By taking the guarantee
into account in setting the rate of interest, Bank has simply ex-
changed value in the form of a reduction in the interest rate for an
equivalent value in the form of Debtor Co.'s promise to pay if Sub-
sidiary Co. defaults. The only party that has gained by the addi-
tion of the guarantee is Subsidiary Co., which is now charged a
lower rate of interest. Since Bank passes the whole value of Debtor
Co.'s promise to Subsidiary Co., Bank could not have received a
fraudulent conveyance.
Although the grant of a guarantee by an insolvent debtor for
less than a reasonably equivalent value is not a fraudulent convey-
ance to the lender, it is a fraudulent conveyance to the obligor.
The obligor has received the benefit of the guarantee, i.e., the value
of the debtor's promise. This either enables the obligor to receive a
loan for which it otherwise would have been ineligible or reduces
the interest rate charged by the lender. In many guarantee transac-
tions, the obligor will not have given value to the *debtor for this
benefit. 4 Where this is the case, the grant of the guarantee is a
fraudulent conveyance by the debtor to the obligor. Just as with
Variation Two, the grant of a guarantee should be recharacterized
as two two-party transactions: (1) the transfer of the guarantee's
value from the lender to the debtor in exchange for the debtor's
promise and (2) the debtor's conveyance of this value to the
obligor.
III. APPLICATION OF SECTION 548(a)(2) TO THE CONVEYANCE FROM
DEBTOR TO OBLIGOR
Viewing the debtor's guarantee as a conveyance of value to the
obligor clarifies the status of a guarantee as a fraudulent convey-
44 A guarantee given without a return of value from the obligor is usually an intercorpo-
rate guarantee. See, e.g., Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 661 F.2d 979, 983-84 (2d
Cir. 1981); cf. Coquillette, supra note 8, at 452 (examining transaction for possible indirect
benefits to the debtor); Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 238-39 (same). Yet one can easily imag-
ine such a guarantee transaction in which the guarantor is not related to the obligor. For
example, if 0 makes a unique kind of microchip that G needs to build its line of personal
computers, and 0 needs a loan to help it through current cash-flow problems, G may agree
to guarantee the loan without receiving direct compensation from 0 because if 0 ceased
operations, G would have to discontinue this line of computers.
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ance. It also, however, raises questions about the mechanics of ap-
plying section 548(a)(2) to the transaction between debtor and ob-
ligor that is implicit in the three-party guarantee transaction.45
Two issues remain to be resolved: (1) at what point in the transac-
tion the debtor conveys value to the obligor and (2) how one deter-
mines whether the debtor has received a reasonably equivalent
value for its guarantee.
A. When the Fraudulent Conveyance Occurs
In order for a transfer of value from the debtor to the obligor
to be considered a fraudulent conveyance under section 548, the
transfer must have occurred "within one year before the date of
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy."4 6 To determine whether
this is the case, one must first locate the time at which the convey-
ance is made. If the transaction involves only a single loan, the
answer is obvious: the conveyance occurs on the date the lending
agreement is signed. At this point, the obligor has received a loan
with more favorable terms than it could have received absent the
guarantee. For example, if Debtor guarantees Bank's $1000 loan to
Friend, and if this guarantee is worth $100, 47 this transaction
should be treated as a $100 transfer from Bank to Debtor in ex-
change for Debtor's promise, followed by a transfer of this $100
from Debtor to Friend, each occurring on the date of the loan.
When the guarantee secures a line of credit,48 determining
" The case law on the issues posed by section 548(a)(2)-when an obligation is in-
curred and what constitutes reasonably equivalent value-is sparse. Only the Second Circuit
has squarely addressed them. In Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 661 F.2d 979 (2d
Cir. 1981), the court held that the debtor incurred an obligation when the lender transferred
value to the obligor, id. at 990, and that the amount covered by the debtor's security inter-
est should be compared with the amount it actually received to determine whether the
transaction was for "fair consideration," id. at 993. (The term "fair consideration" in the old
Bankruptcy Act has been replaced by "reasonably equivalent value" in the Code.)
In Rubin, the court looked for a fraudulent conveyance in the transaction between the
debtor and the lender. This comment has shown that the obligor, not the lender, receives
the benefit of the debtor's guarantee. See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text. The
analysis suggested in this comment requires new approaches to the problems of applying
section 548(a)(2).
46 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a) (West 1979 & Pamphlet No. 2 (Sept. 1984)) (quoted supra note
12).
41 On determining the value of the debtor's guarantee, see infra notes 54-56 and accom-
panying text.
46 Under a line-of-credit lending arrangement, the obligor is entitled to borrow funds at
its discretion from the lender up to a specified limit during a stated period of time. Lines of
credit can be either revocable or irrevocable. Under a revocable line of credit, the lender
may refuse to advance funds to the obligor at any time; under an irrevocable line of credit,
the lender is obligated to advance funds to the obligor upon demand during the period of
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when a debtor made a fraudulent conveyance to the obligor
through its guarantee becomes slightly more difficult. When a line
of credit is guaranteed, the guarantor is either irrevocably bound
to guarantee future advances or it is not-if not, it may withdraw
its promise to guarantee the loan at any time before funds are ac-
tually advanced. 49 If the debtor is bound to guarantee future ad-
vances, it has incurred an obligation as to these advances. By be-
coming bound, the debtor has conveyed value to the obligor
because the obligor has acquired the opportunity to borrow funds
in the future at a rate lower than it could have secured on its own.
If the debtor is not bound to guarantee future advances when it
signs the loan agreement, it has not given any value to the obligor.
Only when the debtor loses the option of voiding its promise has it
conveyed value to the obligor. For example, assume that Debtor
guarantees a line of credit from Bank to Friend. The terms of the
agreement provide that Bank will transfer $1000 to Friend on the
thirtieth of each month and that Debtor will become bound as to
each advance as of the fifteenth of the same month. Assume fur-
ther that the value of this guarantee is $100 for each month that
Debtor guarantees a loan. Under the analysis suggested in this
comment, this transaction should be treated as two two-party
transactions: one in which Debtor has signed a lending agreement
with Bank on the fifteenth of each month providing that Bank will
the agreement.
A line of credit may be subject to covenants written into the lending agreement. For
example, a lender may promise to transfer funds to the obligor upon the obligor's request
provided that the obligor's inventory is worth a certain amount at the time of the request.
These covenants are sought by the lender because they allow it to terminate its obligation to
the obligor when the riskiness of the loan rises above the level it considers acceptable. Be-
cause of these covenants, it may be difficult to classify a line of credit as either revocable or
irrevocable. For example, the conditions in an irrevocable line of credit may be set at such
levels that the lender always has the option of declaring the obligor in violation of the lend-
ing agreement and refusing to disperse any more funds to the obligor. This distinction be-
comes unimportant under the analysis suggested in this comment because the distinction
focuses on when the debtor conveyed value to the obligor, rather than when the lender
becomes bound to transfer value to the obligor. Thus, one benefit of the analysis suggested
in this comment is that it simplifies the inquiry about the date on which the conveyance
occurred. For a discussion of lines of credit, see R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 560, 623 (1981).
49 A lender has an incentive to ensure that it will be bound to transfer value only upon
the fulfillment of certain conditions. See supra note 48. Normally, it will not allow the guar-
antor to have this same freedom. If there is any possibility that the lender will be bound
prior to the time that it transfers value, the lender will want the guarantor to be bound as
well. If the guarantor were allowed to remove itself from a transaction when the lender
could not, the lender could not fully rely upon the guarantee. This uncertainty would in-
crease the cost of the loan. See supra note 42.
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lend Debtor $100 on the thirtieth of that month and the other in
which Debtor has then promised to give Friend $100 at the same
time that Bank disburses the loan to Debtor.5 0
In one special case the debtor should be found to have in-
curred no obligation under its guarantee even though the lending
agreement requires that it guarantee future advances. This is the
case in which the debtor controls the obligor, i.e., when it is a par-
ent corporation bound to guarantee a line of credit in favor of its
subsidiary.5' In this situation, the debtor has not conveyed value to
the obligor because the debtor can prevent the obligor from re-
questing more funds under the lending agreement. For example,
assume that Parent guarantees Subsidiary's line of credit from
Lender and that under the terms of the lending agreement, Parent
is bound upon the signing of the agreement to guarantee all future
advances to Subsidiary. Parent's situation is the same as it would
be if it were not bound because, in either case, Parent can control
whether or not it actually becomes obligated under the guarantee.
Where Parent is formally bound, it can simply instruct Subsidiary
not to borrow any funds; where Parent is not formally bound, it
can tell Lender that it will no longer guarantee any advances to
Subsidiary. In either case, the debtor does not actually become ob-
ligated under its guarantee until the obligor requests funds from
the lender. Thus, when a parent corporation is bound to guarantee
credit extended to its subsidiary, each advance should be treated
as an isolated loan transaction, with value passing from the debtor
on the date of the actual advance.
B. Reasonably Equivalent Value
In identifying a guarantee transaction as a fraudulent convey-
ance under section 548(a)(2), a second requirement is that the
debtor receive less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
50 When a guarantee of a line of credit is challenged, courts must always determine
when the obligation is incurred, not when money is transferred under the agreement. If the
money has been transferred, this transfer can be set aside only if the obligation incurred
under the guarantee was a fraudulent conveyance. The payment of an antecedent debt con-
stitutes value under section 548. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(d)(2) (West 1979 & Pamphlet No. 2
(Sept. 1984)) (quoted supra note 12). Thus, if the guarantee created a valid obligation, the
transfer from Debtor to Friend under the guarantee was for a reasonably equivalent value
because the payment extinguished an obligation of equal value. As a result, only if the trus-
tee can avoid the guarantee at the time the Debtor became bound can he recover any money
paid under the guarantee.
51 This guarantee, however, might not be a fraudulent conveyance because the parent
may have received a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for its guarantee. See infra
notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
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for its guarantee.5 2 In order to make this determination, one must
first establish the point in the transaction at which the value re-
ceived by the debtor should be measured. Three further determi-
nations must then be made: (1) what value the obligor received
from the debtor's guarantee; (2) what value the debtor received in
exchange for its promise; and (3) whether the latter value is rea-
sonably equivalent to the former.
1. When to Measure for Reasonably Equivalent Value.
Traditional contract law and the basic purpose of section 548(a)(2)
call for a measurement of reasonably equivalent value at the time
that the debtor transferred value or incurred an obligation. Tradi-
tional contract law measures the validity of a contract at the time
it is entered into, thereby preventing parties who make improvi-
dent bargains from attempting to avoid responsibility under the
contract simply because the outcome is less favorable than ex-
pected .5 This same rule should apply in determining whether the
debtor received a reasonably equivalent value. If the debtor en-
tered a transaction in which the expected return was reasonably
equivalent to his expected liability, then he should have to live
with the possibility of either gain or loss. If the transaction could
later be set aside because the debtor ultimately paid out more than
it received, the debtor would be able to avoid taking any risk in the
transaction.
Measuring the value received by the debtor at the time an ob-
ligation is incurred or property is transferred also furthers the ba-
sic purpose of section 548(a)(2). Section 548(a)(2) allows the
debtor's creditors to avoid only those transactions that decrease
the debtor's net worth. If a debtor makes a conveyance and re-
ceives in exchange a reasonably equivalent value at the time of the
conveyance, its creditors have not been harmed. The value of the
assets that they can look to in order to satisfy their claims is the
same before and after the transaction. The fact that the value of
the debtor's assets decreases later, because events did not turn out
as expected, should not affect the determination. If ex post mea-
surement were permitted, the debtor's creditors would in effect be
52 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(2)(A) (West 1979 & Pamphlet No. 2 (Sept. 1984)) (quoted supra
note 12).
" This follows directly from the nature of a contract. As Oliver Wendell Holmes
pointed out over a century ago, a contract essentially is a process by which one party ac-
cepts the risk of a certain event not happening. See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 298-
300 (1881). If one were to judge the validity of the contract after the occurrence or nonoc-
currence of the crucial event, one would vitiate the entire purpose of contracting before the
event.
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permitted to shift the risk of the transaction to the other party to
the transaction. They would share in the gains if the transaction
proved to be favorable and bear none of the losses if it proved to
be a bad deal. Because it would do more than preserve creditors'
rights to repayment out of the debtor's assets, this pattern would
not serve the purpose of section 548(a)(2). It would in effect pro-
vide creditors with a windfall at the expense of other parties that
had contracted with the debtor.
2. The Value of the Debtor's Guarantee. The value of the
debtor's promise to repay the loan in case of a default by the obli-
gor should be computed by determining the expected value of the
debtor's liability under the guarantee. 4 This standard of valuation
closely approximates the market value of the guarantee. A guaran-
tor in an arm's-length transaction will demand a price determined
by using such an expected-value standard. 5 For example, assume
that Friend borrows one million dollars from Bank and that
Debtor guarantees the loan. If there is an eighty-percent
probability that Friend will repay the entire loan, a ten-percent
probability of his repaying half of the loan, and a ten-percent
probability of his defaulting completely, then Debtor, in an arm's-
length transaction, would charge Friend $150,000 for the
guarantee. 56
This valuation standard also comports with the purpose of
section 548(a)(2) because it allows only those transactions that de-
crease the debtor's net worth to be avoided under section
548(a)(2). If the guarantee were valued at an amount greater than
that dictated by the expected-value standard, the debtor would
have to receive compensation worth more than the (negative) value
5 Reasonably equivalent value should not be determined by comparing the amount, if
any, that the debtor, due to the obligor's default, paid under the guarantee with the amount
the debtor received in exchange for the guarantee. This would be contrary to the notion that
the value of the contract should be ascertained as of the time that it is entered into, not
after events have shown that the actual value differed from the expected value. See supra
note 53 and accompanying text.
55 See generally V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE
FINANCE 35-75 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing the relationship of expected returns and risk to
value).
11 This expected value is calculated as follows: (.80 x $0) + (.10 x $500,000) + (.10 x
$1,000,000) = 0 + $50,000 + $100,000 = $150,000. This example assumes that Debtor is
certain to repay the loan if called upon to do so. If there is only a 50% chance that Debtor
will be able to meet its obligation to repay the balance of the loan at any given time, the
value of its guarantee would be $75,000. Debtor would be forced to take its own risk of
insolvency into consideration when pricing its guarantee because a lending institution will
do so in determining the interest rate it will charge Friend. If Debtor did not do this, other
parties could offer a similar guarantee at a lower price.
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of the risk it was undertaking in order to receive a reasonably
equivalent value. Such a standard would allow transactions that do
not decrease the net worth of the debtor to be avoided as fraudu-
lent conveyances. If the guarantee were valued at less than the ex-
pected value of the debtor's liability-thus increasing the
probability that a "reasonably equivalent value" will be
found-the debtor could decrease its net worth and impair its
creditors' rights in contravention of the purpose of section
548(a)(2).
3. The Value Received by the Debtor. After determining the
value of the debtor's guarantee, i.e., the amount the debtor should
have received in return for its guarantee, one must determine the
value that the debtor could reasonably have expected to receive
when it gave its promise. If the obligor pays the debtor in cash, the
determination is straightforward. But this is not the typical scena-
rio. In the more common case of an intercorporate guarantee, the
debtor will rarely be paid in cash.57 In these instances, it must be
determined whether the debtor could reasonably have expected to
receive any other value, in the form of indirect benefits from its
affiliate, when it gave its guarantee and, if so, the amount of those
benefits. 8 The concept of indirect benefits is well established in
the case law, which recognizes that a party to a transaction may
receive benefits in the absence of a direct receipt of value.59 Thus,
57 See, e.g., Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 661 F.2d 979, 982-84 (2d Cir. 1981).
The primary benefit to the borrower from an intercorporate guarantee is that it either al-
lows the borrower to receive a loan it would not otherwise receive or enables it to receive a
lower interest rate.
16 See id. at 993-94 (remanding because the district court, although it found that the
guarantor received indirect benefits, failed to measure these benefits); see also Coquillette,
supra note 8, at 542-54; Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 243-46.
59 To demonstrate the concept of indirect benefits, assume that Debtor Co. is in the
business of making computers. Essential to Debtor Co.'s production of computers is a cer-
tain kind of microchip made only by Friend Co. Assume further that Friend Co. needs a
$10,000 loan to repair recent fire damage at its plant. Because Debtor Co. is dependent on
Friend Co. for its success, Debtor Co. guarantees the loan and receives no direct remunera-
tion from Friend Co. This loan may be supported by a reasonably equivalent value in the
form of the benefits that Debtor Co. expects to receive from Friend Co.'s operations. For
cases finding the existence of indirect benefits in a variety of bankruptcy contexts, see Klein
v. Tabatchnick, 610 F.2d 1043, 1047-48 (2d Cir. 1979) (debtor may have received fair consid-
eration through indirect benefits when it supplied securities to third party in exchange for
third party's collateralization of existing loan to a minority shareholder of the debtor; other-
wise the minority shareholder would have withdrawn his capital from debtor, leaving it with
severe cash and capital problems); Williams v. Twin City Co., 251 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir.
1958) (debtor's transfer of stock to mother-in-law in exchange for mother-in-law's guarantee
of note of debtor to his creditors constitutes fair consideration); McNellis v. Raymond, 287
F. Supp. 232, 238-39 (N.D.N.Y. 1968) (identity of interest between corporation and owner of
corporation makes owner's payment of corporation's loans not fraudulent because there is
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although a parent may have received no direct benefits in exchange
for its guarantee, it may have received a reasonably equivalent
value through indirect benefits.60
4. Comparing the Value Received to the Value Transferred.
Whether the value a debtor receives is reasonably equivalent to the
value it conveys is an issue of fact.6 1 In an arm's-length transac-
tion, the two values involved are often readily determinable.6 2 If
the debtor is an affiliate6 3 of the obligor, however, determining the
value received by the debtor relative to the value of its guarantee
is not so simple:6 4 there usually will be no readily determinable
market value for the guarantee, and often it will be difficult to
compute in dollar terms the value of the indirect benefits that the
debtor receives in return for the guarantee. Thus, any attempt to
compare the actual values may only compound the uncertainties.
In order to avoid such difficult and possibly uncertain calculations,
rebuttable presumptions about the existence or nonexistence of a
reasonably equivalent value should be established; these presump-
tions should be based upon the nature of the corporate relation-
ship between the debtor and the obligor. 5
fair consideration), aff'd in relevant part, 420 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1970); In re Missionary
Baptist Found., 24 Bankr. 973, 979 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982) (good will generated by charita-
ble contribution enough to constitute a reasonably equivalent value).
60 The existence of these indirect benefits is an issue of fact. See, e.g., Klein v.
Tabatchnick, 610 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1979).
62 See Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 661 F.2d 979, 993-94 (2d Cir. 1981);
Gower v. Cohn, 643 F.2d 1146, 1159 (5th Cir. 1981).
62 How the trier of fact decides what a reasonably equivalent value is in a particular
case is beyond the scope of this comment. Courts have been reluctant to deem a minimum
fixed percentage of fair market value a "reasonably equivalent value." See, e.g., Gilman v.
Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982)
("Naturally, reasonable equivalence will depend on the facts of each case. In some cases, no
less than 100 percent of fair market value may be a reasonable price."). As a result, courts
have reached disparate results in determining whether the debtor received a reasonably
equivalent value. See, e.g., Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins., 621 F.2d 201, 203-04 (5th Cir.
1980) (57.7% of fair market value does not constitute a reasonably equivalent value); Moore
v. Gilmore (In re Gilmore), 31 Bankr. 615, 617-18 (E.D. Wash. 1983) (price somewhere be-
tween 63% and 76% of fair market value constitutes a reasonably equivalent value);
Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Inc. v. Equitable Trust (In re Perdido Bay Country
Club Estates, Inc.), 23 Bankr. 36, 39-40 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (70% of fair market value
constitutes a reasonably equivalent value); Madrid v. Del Mar Commerce Co. (In re Ma-
drid), 21 Bankr. 424, 426-27 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (67% of fair market value constitutes a
reasonably equivalent value).
63 See supra note 4.
64 See, e.g., Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 661 F.2d 979, 993-94 (2d Cir. 1981)
(remanding to the district court, with explicit instructions for determining value received,
because of complexity of transaction and relationships at issue).
"5 See Garrett v. Falkner (In re Royal Crown Bottlers), 23 Bankr. 28, 30 (Bankr. D. Ala.
1982) (suggesting a similar presumption); see also Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 238 ("The
Guarantees and Section 548(a)(2)
When a debtor guarantees the obligations of its wholly owned
subsidiary, there should be a rebuttable presumption that the
debtor received a reasonably equivalent value through indirect
benefits. Since the parent, as sole owner of the subsidiary, is enti-
tled to all of its subsidiary's gain in value, an increase in the value
of the subsidiary results in an increase of the same magnitude in
the parent's assets. The expected net increase in the value of the
subsidiary is the value of the parent's guarantee. Because this in-
crease in value accrues to the parent's benefit by virtue of the cor-
porate relationship between the parent and its subsidiary, the par-
ent in this situation can be presumed to receive a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for its guarantee of its subsidiary's
loan.
A similar analysis is appropriate when the debtor owns less
than one hundred percent of the subsidiary. For example, if the
debtor owns sixty percent of its subsidiary's stock, then it can be
presumed that the parent will receive only sixty percent of the net
increase in the value of the subsidiary.6 This would also be true if
it owned ninety, or thirty, percent of the obligor, and although the
exact percentage of ownership necessary for the benefits received
to be deemed less than reasonably equivalent will depend upon
how the trier of fact defines "reasonably equivalent, '61 two ele-
ments of uncertainty have been removed from the fact-finding pro-
cess. Rather than requiring the fact-finder to ascertain two abso-
lute figures before comparing for reasonable equivalence, this
method allows the fact-finder to focus exclusively on the relation-
ship between the figures. 8
The trustee could rebut the presumption that a reasonably
equivalent value was received in two ways. First, the trustee could
prove that the subsidiary was insolvent at the time the debtor in-
curred an obligation under the guarantee. If the subsidiary were
insolvent, no benefits could flow to the debtor by virtue of the cor-
legal adequacy of the consideration [when the parent guarantees the loan of its subsidiary]
cannot . . . be seriously questioned.").
" This method of calculating the benefit it receives from an increase in the value of its
subsidiary is employed by many corporations in determining what they will receive from the
increase in value of a partially owned subsidiary. See, e.g., Dower v. Mosser Indus., 648 F.2d
183, 184 (3d Cir. 1981) (corporation would guarantee a loan to its subsidiary only if it could
acquire 100% ownership because otherwise it would "share the benefits [of the loan] with
minority shareholders who did not assume any risk").
See supra note 62.
es Since the Code requires only that the parent own 20% of the subsidiary to be consid-
ered an affiliate of the subsidiary, 11 U.S.C. § 101(2)(B) (1982) (quoted supra note 4), reli-
ance on the Code's definition of affiliate would be inappropriate.
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porate relationship between the debtor and its subsidiary-any in-
crease in the subsidiary's value would accrue only to the benefit of
its creditors.6 9
Even if the trustee succeeded in rebutting the presumption
that a reasonably equivalent value had been received, the obligor
could still prevail if it proved that the debtor reasonably expected
to receive enough indirect benefits, from sources other than the
corporate structure, to constitute a reasonably equivalent value. °
For example, it might be shown that the debtor benefited from the
guarantee because the subsidiary constituted its only source for an
essential raw material, and the subsidiary would have been forced
into liquidation without the proceeds of a new loan. This would
reintroduce into the proceeding evidentiary complications concern-
ing the existence of indirect benefits, but it would only be neces-
sary if the debtor's subsidiary were insolvent or if the debtor did
not own a large percentage of the subsidiary's stock.
If the debtor guarantees the debts of either its parent or a fel-
low subsidiary, there should be a rebuttable presumption against
the existence of a reasonably equivalent value. Since the subsidiary
would have no ownership claim against the obligor arising out of
their corporate relationship, none of the increase in the obligor's
net worth could accrue to the benefit of the debtor. Unless some
direct consideration were paid, the obligor's position would be sim-
ilar to that of the debtor who was the parent of the obligor where
the trustee had rebutted the presumption in favor of a reasonably
equivalent value. The obligor would bear the burden of demon-
strating that the debtor could have been expected to receive
enough indirect benefits to constitute a reasonably equivalent
value.
CONCLUSION
Section 548(a)(2) empowers the trustee to set aside convey-
ances that decrease the net worth of the debtor and impair the
rights of its creditors. In order to apply this provision properly, it
must be recognized that the grant of a guarantee is a conveyance
by the debtor solely for the benefit of the obligor. It is this implicit
transaction between debtor and obligor that must be examined in
69 This is because the parent is only the residual owner of the subsidiary. If the subsidi-
ary is insolvent, any value accruing to the subsidiary by virtue of the guarantee would go
toward satisfying the claims of the subsidiary's creditors; none of the gain would go to the
parent.
10 See supra note 59.
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order to determine whether a fraudulent conveyance has occurred
under section 548(a)(2).
Under this analysis, the debtor incurs an obligation when it
becomes bound to guarantee the value given by the lender to the
obligor. The value of this obligation equals the debtor's expected
liability under the guarantee. If the debtor owns a substantial per-
centage of the obligor, there should be a rebuttable presumption
that the debtor received a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for its guarantee.
Robert K. Rasmussen
